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Criminal Procedure
by Charles E. Cox, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Each year the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
issues numerous decisions concerning the protections provided to
criminal defendants by the United States Constitution. This Article
surveys decisions issued in 2003 that are likely to be of interest to
criminal law practitioners.

II.
A.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Investigatory Stops and Frisks

In United States v. Dunn,' defendant was convicted of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),2 and defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.3 In Dunn private
security guards hired by the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta4
heard more than one volley of gunshots, so they moved in the general
direction of the gunshots. Within five minutes after the last volley of
gunshots, the security guards encountered defendant and observed him

* Attorney at Law, Macon, Georgia. LaGrange College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1982);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1986). Law
Clerk to the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick of the Middle District of Georgia, 1986-1987.
Assistant United States Attorney, Middle District of Georgia, 1989-1995. Member, State
Bar of Georgia; National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Mr. Cox practices
criminal defense in Macon, Georgia.
1. 345 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2003).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
3. 345 F.3d at 1286. Defendant was tried in a bench trial based on stipulated facts.
Defendant did not contest the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress,
and the parties stipulated that the government had proven the essential elements of the
case. Id. at 1288.

4. Id. The contract for the private security guards expressly contemplates that they
may make arrests. Id.
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placing an SKS assault rifle in the trunk of his automobile. The security
guards drew their weapons and detained defendant in handcuffs pending
the arrival of an Atlanta police officer.5 During the approximately ten
to fifteen minutes it took for the first police officer to arrive, two
witnesses informed the security guards that defendant was not the
person responsible for the gunshots. When the first police officer
arrived, he placed defendant in the back of his patrol car and called for
a gun investigator. The gun investigator arrived approximately ten
minutes later and advised defendant of his Miranda rights. At that
point defendant admitted to being a convicted felon and to owning the
assault rifle.6
Defendant conceded on appeal that the security guards hired by the
Housing Authority had reasonable suspicion under Terry7 to believe that
criminal activity was afoot;' however, defendant contended that his
seizure and detention "exceeded the outer boundaries of an investigatory
Terry stop and became a de facto arrest."9 Defendant contended that
the officer learned of defendant's status as a convicted felon as a result
of defendant's unlawful detention. ° The Eleventh Circuit pretermitted
the issue of whether defendant's detention was a permissible investigative detention under Terry by concluding that the security guards and
the police had probable cause to believe that defendant had discharged
his firearm in public, violating Georgia law.11 The court concluded that
"[p]lainly, a reasonable person could have concluded that [defendant]
"12
th
had just fired his weapon, and the uncorroborated statements of the
two witnesses and the fact that the officers found no shell casings did
not change that result.1 3
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Dunn is consistent with prior
holdings by the Eleventh Circuit that "arresting officers, in deciding
whether probable cause exists, are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the
circumstances present a sufficient basis for believing that an offense has
been committed." 4 As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, "probable cause

5.
Id. at
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1286-87. The security guards called the police once defendant was detained.
1287.
Id. at 1287.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
345 F.3d at 1289.
Id.
See id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id. at 1291-92.
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002).
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[does not] require certainty on the part of the police. 'Sufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment." ' 15
B.

Traffic Stops

In United States v. Perkins,6 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's order suppressing all statements made and evidence obtained
during a traffic stop 7 in which an Alabama Highway Patrol officer
stopped defendant driver after observing his car crossing the white line
onto the shoulder of the road. The officer checked defendant's driver's
license and insurance and then asked him to get out of his vehicle, so
the officer could issue him a warning ticket for a lane violation.
Although the officer informed defendant that he would be free to leave
after receiving the warning citation, the officer checked defendant for
weapons and directed
him to sit in the patrol car while completing the
8
warning ticket.'
Noticing that defendant had a Florida driver's license, the officer
asked defendant if Florida was his destination. In response, defendant
explained that he had relocated from Florida to Montgomery, Alabama,
where he was employed and that he was headed to Greenville, Alabama,
to visit his cousin, Shantay. During this questioning, defendant was not
free to leave.' 9
After a driver's license check revealed that defendant had a valid
license and no outstanding warrants, the officer gave the warning ticket
to defendant for his signature and completed the portion of his
investigation relating to the traffic stop.2 ° Even though the officer had
issued the warning citation, the officer "continued to detain [defendant]
because of his nervousness; what he perceived as [defendant's] evasive
behavior in response to his questions;2' and his hunch that [defendant]
was being untruthful about his destination."22 At this point the officer
decided to question defendant passenger. In response to the officer's
questions, the passenger informed the officer that he and defendant
driver were going to Greenville, that he was going to be visiting a girl

15. Id. (quoting Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(citations omitted)).
16. 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003).
17. Id. at 967.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 967-68.
20. Id. at 968.
21. Id. The officer testified that defendant nervously repeated the officer's questions
before answering them. Id.
22. Id.
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named
Quinn, and that he had no knowledge of illegal drugs in the
23
car.

After questioning the passenger, the officer returned to the patrol car,
took back the signed warning ticket from the driver, and continued to
question him. After defendant driver denied that drugs were in the car
and denied the officer's request for consent to search, the officer called
for a drug-sniffing dog. After the dog arrived, the officer placed the
passenger in the patrol car with defendant driver. Unaware that their
conversation was being taped, defendants had a conversation in the back
of the car about whether the dog would be able to find drugs. After the
officer spoke with the canine officer, he returned to the patrol car and
repeatedly questioned the driver until he admitted that drugs were in
the car and showed the officer where they were hidden.24
The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendants' arguments that the duration
of the traffic stop itself was unconstitutional.25 While "[a] traffic stop
may be prolonged where an officer is able to articulate a reasonable
suspicion of other illegal activity beyond the traffic offense,"26 the court
concluded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to continue
the detention of defendants after issuing the warning ticket.27
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that a traffic stop is an "'unsettling
show of authority,'"2" and the officer could not articulate any reason
why he suspected that the driver's ne, vousness was tied to anything
other than being detained by an authority figure.29 The court rejected
the argument that the driver's habit of repeating a question back to the
officer before answering was odd behavior and instead attributed it to
anxiety.3" The Eleventh Circuit declared, "Indeed, it is a common
occurrence at oral arguments before this Court by even the most
seasoned lawyers."3 1 Finally, the court reasoned that defendants'
explanations of who they were intending to visit did not contradict one

23. Id.
24. Id. at 968-69.
25. Id. at 969-70.
26. Id. at 970 (citing United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)).
27. Id. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Perkins is in contrast to its previous decision
in United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991), in which the court held
that after giving defendant a warning ticket, the deputy did not unreasonably detain
defendant by requesting consent to search defendant's car. Id. In Harris, however,
[defendant] was: "(1) driving a rental car with a restricted license; (2) 'shaking' and acting
,extremely nervous'; and (3) gave conflicting responses as to where he had been." Id.
28. 348 F.3d at 970 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 971.
31. Id.
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another.32 Defendants "could have intended to see both persons during
their visit, or [defendant driver] could have intended to visit Shantay
while [defendant passenger] visited Quinn."" Because the driver's
consent was the result of an unlawful detention, the consent was tainted,
made and evidence seized during the detention had
and any statements
34
to be suppressed.

In United States v. Chanthasouxat,5 defendants appealed the district
court's denial of their motion to suppress. The arresting officer stopped
the van in which defendants were riding for failure to have an inside
rear-view mirror. After receiving permission from the driver to search
the van, the arresting officer found approximately fifteen kilograms of
cocaine. Defendants were placed in the back of the patrol car while the
officer searched the van. Defendants' conversation, which was recorded
by a video camera in the patrol car, demonstrated that defendants knew
they were carrying cocaine."
Defendants argued that the arresting officer lacked both probable
cause and reasonable suspicion to stop the van because neither
municipal nor state law requires an inside rear-view mirror. In response
the Government argued that the applicable statute was ambiguous and
that the applicable traffic laws reasonably could be construed to require
an inside rear-view mirror.37
The Eleventh Circuit explained that "[a] traffic stop based on an
officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the
Fourth Amendment .... Thus, if an officer makes a traffic stop based
on a mistake of fact, the only question is whether his mistake of fact was
The court concluded, however, that in this case the
reasonable."'
officer's mistake was one of law.39 The statute at issue required a rearview mirror, but the statute contained no requirement that the mirror
be located inside the vehicle.4" Even if the statute was ambiguous, the
court declined to use that ambiguity against defendants when the
language of the statute did not explicitly require an inside rear-view
The court held that "a mistake of law, no matter how
mirror.4

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1272-73.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1279.
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reasonable or understandable, can [never] provide the objectively
42
reasonable grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause."
The court also rejected the Government's arguments that the
defendant driver's consent to search the van cured any taint on the
evidence discovered as a result of the unconstitutional stop.43 For a
consent given after an illegal seizure to be valid, the Government must
prove that the consent is voluntary and that the consent was not a
product of the illegal seizure. 4 In determining whether a voluntary
consent was a product of the illegal seizure, the court considers: "(1) the
temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the
presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy
of the initial misconduct."4 ' After examining these three factors, the
court determined there was "no break in the causal chain between the
illegal traffic stop and [defendant's] consent to search the van."46
Accordingly, the evidence obtained during the search had to be
suppressed because the consent was a product of the illegal traffic stop
rather than "an independent act of free will."4"
4
In United States v. Franklin,
" the Eleventh Circuit examined the
extent to which a defendant's flight when approached by a law enforcement officer may be considered for a finding of reasonable suspicion.4 9
The law enforcement officers in Franklin were "patrolling the 'problem
areas' of the city."5" Uniformed officers observed defendant "in a
'problem area,' at night, standing under a 'no loitering' sign."5 The
officers decided to stop and ask defendant what he was doing. 2 The
court in Franklin assumed that these facts were insufficient to give the
officers reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop; however,
"[tihe officers . . . could still approach [defendant] and speak to him."53
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, "'There is nothing in the Constitution

42. Id. The court also held that the statements defendants made while in the back of
the patrol car were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and should be suppressed. Id. at 1281.
43. Id. at 1280.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir. 2000)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 323 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 166 (2003).
49. Id. at 1300.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1301. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the Supreme Court
stated that "the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Id.
52. 323 F.3d at 1300.
53. Id. at 1301.
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a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the
which prevents
54
streets."'

Defendant ran away as soon as he saw the officers. Not surprisingly,
the officers chased him. When the officers finally caught and tackled
defendant, he explained that he had an outstanding arrest warrant, and
the officers found defendant in possession of crack cocaine and marijuana. Defendant contended that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
to stop him.55
The court reasoned that in seeking to establish reasonable suspicion,
the officers could consider everything that happened to the point that
the officers tackled and seized defendant.5" The Supreme Court has
stated that flight is a relevant consideration in determining reasonable
suspicion, and defendant's flight in this instance was particularly
important.5 7 Defendant's flight in Franklin was especially suspicious
because of the nature and duration of the flight. 58 Defendant "took off
in 'headlong' flight,"59 which is "'the consummate act of evasion.""
The duration of his flight "more clearly indicated potential involvement
in wrongdoing" 61 than simply a desire to "remove himself from a
potentially dangerous situation. " 62 The court concluded that defendant's flight was unprovoked and was such that a "reasonable and
innocent person facing [that] situation would [not] have been caused to
flee in the same manner as [defendant]."63 Considering defendant's
unprovoked flight, along with the other circumstances of the stop, the
officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of
defendant.'
In United States v. Boyce,65 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district
court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.66 A Liberty
County Sheriff's Deputy stopped defendant driver for driving ten miles
per hour under the speed limit and weaving, suspecting that defendant

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
fleeing
64.
65.
66.

Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)).
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1302 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124).
Id.
Id.
Id. "[Olfficers cannot improperly provoke-for example by fraud-a person into
and use the flight to justify a stop." Id.
Id. at 1303.
351 F.3d 1102 (llth Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1104.
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driver might be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. After questioning defendant about his travel plans, the officer informed defendant that
he would not be giving him a ticket, and he told defendant to return to
his car while the officer looked for his warning citation book. Seven
minutes later, after receiving a license report on defendant and writing
a warning citation, the officer explained that he was only giving
defendant a "courtesy warning."6 7 The officer then asked defendant if
there were any drugs or weapons in the car. After defendant told the
officer that there were no drugs in the car and refused the officer's
request for a consent to search, the officer returned to his vehicle and
called for a drug-sniffing dog on the radio. The officer told defendant to
wait until the drug dog arrived. Approximately six minutes after calling
for the drug dog, the officer radioed in a request for a criminal history
check on defendant.68 "This report had not come back six minutes later
when the drug dogs arrived and alerted on [defendant's] trunk."6 9
The Eleventh Circuit court rejected the Government's arguments that
the court's prior decision in United States v. Purcell" stood for the
proposition that an officer "may generally detain a driver to await the
results of a criminal history check so long as the detention does not last
an unreasonably long time."7 ' The court noted that in Purcell, the
criminal history check was part of a routine computer check.72 In this
case, however, the criminal history check was not part of a routine
computer check, and the officer did not even request the check until
after he had informed the driver he would be getting a warning
citation.73 The court concluded that once the original traffic stop
investigation was concluded, the officer should have released defendant
"unless he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of some other
74
criminal wrong doing."
The Eleventh Circuit in Boyce rejected the officer's testimony and the
findings of the district court that defendant was nervous, sweating
profusely, being unusually talkative, and moving back and forth like he
was about to run."s The court stated, "We find that the district court
clearly erred in finding [defendant] was 'unusually nervous' because the

67. Id. at 1105.
68. Id. at 1104-05.

69. Id. at 1105.
70.

236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001). See Charles E. Cox, Jr., ConstitutionalCriminal

Procedure,53 MERCER L. REV. 1339, 1339-42 (2002) (discussing the decision in Purcell).
71.
72.
73.

351 F.3d at 1107.
Id.
Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 1108.
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videotape belies [the officer's] testimony as to these behaviors." 6
Without the factors related to defendant's nervousness, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the factors that did exist-driving a rental car on
a known drug corridor and planning to return the rental car two days
after expiration of the rental agreement-did not create reasonable
suspicion.7 7 The court reasoned that "[tihese factors 'would likely apply
to a considerable number of those traveling for perfectly legitimate
purposes' and 'do not reasonably provide ... suspicion of criminal
activity.' ' 78 Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded that the officer could 79not detain defendant beyond the initial
investigation of the traffic stop.
The court was troubled that the officer apparently prolonged the
traffic stop and called the drug dog unit simply because defendant had
refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. 0 The court noted that
"[t]he only significant event between the time that [the officer] wrote the
warning citation and the time [the officer] called the drug dog unit was
[defendant] asserting his constitutional right not to let [the officer]
search his car."" The court stressed that law enforcement officers
"cannot base their decision to prolong a traffic stop on the detainee's
refusal to consent to a search. Such a refusal may only be considered
when the police have already observed, before asking for permission to
search, facts sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion." 2 The videotape
of the car stop in Boyce showed that the officer had not observed facts
sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion prior to asking for
consent.8 3 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the detention and
search were unconstitutional "[b]ecause the tape shows that [the officer]
did unlawfully base8 4his decision [to call the drug dog] on [defendant's]
refusal to consent."
The decision in Boyce left unresolved defendant's argument that the
officer exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop when the officer began

76. Id.
77. Id. at 1109. See also United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 509 n.17 (11th
Cir. 2003) ("The more 'travel between source cities' comes to mean just 'travel,' the less
persuasive such travel becomes in the probable-cause analysis.").
78. 351 F.3d at 1109 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 707 (11th Cir.
1986)).
79. Id. at 1110.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001)).

83. Id. at 1111.
84.

Id.
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questioning defendant about drugs and guns.8 5 The Eleventh Circuit's
previous decision in Purcell clearly stated that a law enforcement
officer's actions "during a traffic stop must be 'reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place,'"86 and the decision identified two possible tests for determining
when police questioning exceeds the permissible scope of a routine traffic
stop. 7 One test limits the officer's questions to those that are justified
by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or safety concerns, and the
other test prohibits questions unrelated to the duration of the initial stop
if they extend the duration of the car stop.88 The court in Boyce determined that it was unnecessary to determine which test is controlling in
the Eleventh Circuit because the car stop in this instance was unlawful
89
under either test.
In United States v. Clark, ° the court addressed whether "a lawenforcement officer may briefly detain and order a passenger to reenter
an automobile to protect the officer's safety while the officer investigates
a crime committed in his presence by two associates of the passenger."91 The officer observed two men fighting in an area of the city
where the officer had responded to a "'lot of calls involving violence.'"9 2
The officer observed an automobile near the two men, and he observed
a third man, not engaged in criminal activity, watching the fight. When
the officer approached the men, all three admitted that they had been
in the car.93 The officer ordered all three men into the automobile in
order "to gain control of the situation for his own safety."94 When a
backup officer arrived, he noticed defendant sitting in the car, "'fumbling
around under the seat.'"9" When the backup officer opened the door to
remove defendant from the car, an Uzi, semi-automatic assault weapon,
fell onto the street.9 6
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court previously had
held that an officer could order a passenger not suspected of violating

85. Id.
86. 236 F.3d at 1277.
87. 351 F.3d at 1111 (citing Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279-80).
88. Id. (citing Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279-80).
89. Id.
90. 337 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
91. Id. at 1282.
92. Id. at 1283.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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the law to exit a vehicle out of concern for officer safety." In addition,
in the context of a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,98 the Eleventh Circuit previously recognized that "'a police
officer performing his lawful duties may direct and control-to some
extent-the movements and location of persons nearby, even99persons that
the officer may have no reason to suspect of wrongdoing.'

After considering the totality of the circumstances, including
defendant's proximity to unlawful activity, the court concluded that
concerns for officer safety and the need to control a potentially dangerous situation outweighed defendant's liberty interest.1 °0 Therefore, the
officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he ordered
defendant back into the car.'0 1 In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stressed that this was not a case in which the officer had
detained someone who was in no way associated with any criminal
wrongdoing or "was simply an unrelated bystander to a traffic violation
or to an altercation between other persons."0 2
C.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Consent
In United States v. Young,"°3 defendant contended that the district

court erred in not suppressing the results of a warrantless search
conducted by the IRS on a Federal Express package addressed to
defendant. The IRS was investigating defendant for various tax
offenses, and the IRS believed that defendant's scheme involved sending
large cash transactions via Federal Express. As part of the investigation, an IRS agent asked Federal Express to allow the IRS to view
packages bearing defendant's name. Federal Express agreed, and
fourteen packages x-rayed by the IRS were found to contain large
amounts of currency. The search results were used to obtain other
search warrants.' 4
The evidence in Young showed that the Federal Express airbills
contained a notice advising customers that Federal Express has a
"RIGHT TO INSPECT [-] We may, at our option, open and inspect your

97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1285-86 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
337 F.3d at 1286-87 (quoting Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir.

2000)).
100. Id. at 1287-88.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1288.
103. 350 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003).
104. Id. at 1303-05. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the use of an x-ray device to
reveal the objects within a package constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1307 n.1.
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packages prior to or after you give them to us to deliver."10 5 In
addition, on the outside of each package, just above the pouch that
contained the airbill was another warning in all capital letters stating:
"DO NOT SEND CASH."0 6 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that "[n]o reasonable
person would expect to retain his or her privacy interest in a packaged
shipment after signing an airbill containing an explicit, written warning
that the carrier is authorized to act in direct contravention to that
interest." 7
The Eleventh Circuit held that "[a]s a matter of law,
[these warnings] eliminate[d] any expectation of privacy. " "'s
Defendant in United States v. Backus °9 entered a plea of guilty to
being a felon in possession of a firearm, conditioned on his right to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress." ° The
Eleventh Circuit held that an estranged wife, who still jointly owned the
marital home, but who had not resided in that home for a number of
months, could effectively consent to a search of that marital home."'
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion details the years of verbal and physical
abuse to which defendant subjected his wife." 2 Defendant and his
wife were married in 1990. The abuse culminated in an especially
violent episode in April of 2001 that caused defendant's wife to flee the
marital home with their young son."' Defendant's wife
was able to take her purse, cell phone, and keys but nothing more. Left
behind were all of her and [her son's] clothes except what they had on,
all of his toys (he was [ten] or [eleven] years old then), and all of their
personal belongings, including some of her jewelry."'

105. Id. at 1307.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1308.
108. Id. In the alternative, the court ruled that the notice contained on the airbill
authorized Federal Express as bailee to consent to a search of the package. Id. The court
stated:
Courts have recognized that a third party has actual authority to consent to a
search of a container if the owner of the container has expressly authorized the
third party to give consent, or if the third party has mutual use of the container
and joint access to or control over the container.
Id.
109. 349 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).
110. Id. at 1299.
111. Id. at 1305.
112. Id. at 1300-01.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1301.
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Defendant's wife and son fled from Miami to Chicago, where they lived
in shelters for six months. During those six months, defendant's wife
returned to Miami only twice, and on neither occasion did she see
defendant or attempt to return to the marital home." 5 In October
2001, defendant called his mother-in-law's house and "threatened to kill
his wife's family and to gouge her mother's eyes out with a spoon."" 6
The Miami police charged defendant with this threat, and in the context
of that investigation, they spoke with defendant's wife." '
Defendant's wife told the Miami police that her husband, a convicted
felon, had a number of firearms in the house."' She knew about these
firearms "because her husband, whose criminal record prevented him
from buying them, had made her buy them for him. He had threatened
to harm her if she didn't help him get the firearms .
.",
".". Law
enforcement officers went to the marital home to arrest defendant for
domestic abuse and to search for firearms. The keys belonging to
defendant's wife opened the lower lock on the door, but the deadbolt
looked to have been recently replaced. Defendant's wife gave officers
permission to open the door by force. 2 ° The officers found a shotgun,
three assault weapons, and about four thousand rounds of ammunition
in the gun safe, "which they opened with the combination [defendant's
wife] had given them."' 2'
The Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty concluding that defendant's
estranged wife effectively could consent to the search of the marital
home.' 22 The court rejected defendant's arguments that his wife had
abandoned the marital home.' 23 The court stated, "Only when the
violence [defendant] was inflicting on [his wife and] son became too
much to take did she leave the home. But for his criminal acts against
them, [defendant's wife] would have stayed there."124 The court also
rejected defendant's contentions that the search infringed on his

115. Id. at 1301-02.
116. Id. at 1302.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1303.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1304. "We said at the beginning of this opinion that the case presents an
interesting Fourth Amendment issue, and it does. We didn't say that it was a difficult
issue, and it is not." Id. at 1303-04.
123. Id. at 1304.
124. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that its decision was consistent with all other
circuits "that have addressed issues involving consent from an estranged wife to search the
marital home from which she has fled." Id. at 1305.
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expectations of privacy. 125 Defendant argued that he had no reason to
expect that his wife would return and assert any control over the marital
home. 1 26 First, the court reasoned that defendant's expectation of
privacy in this instance was unreasonable and that "[a] lawless man
cannot use violence to drive his wife away and then reasonably expect
the law to give him the benefit of her absence."' 27 The court also noted
that if defendant truly had not expected his wife to return, it would have
to change the deadbolt lock to prevent her key from
been unnecessary
28
working in it.'
D.

Probable Cause and Arrest

1. Asset Forfeiture. In United States v. $242,484.00,129 the
Eleventh Circuit reversed a forfeiture order, concluding that the
government had failed to establish probable cause to support the
The claimant in $242,484.00 had purchased
forfeiture of the cash.'
a round-trip ticket from Miami to New York City for $93. While in New

125. Id. at 1304.
126. Id.
127. Id. The court's comments are also consistent with a general reluctance to allow
defendants to use circumstances created by their own wrongdoing to form the basis for a
claim of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2003)
(The state court's ...determination that [defendant], by his hunger strike (which
contributed to his incompetency), forfeited his right to be competent at trial is
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the pertinent federal law
in the light of the state court's reasonable determination of facts supported by the
evidence presented at the state proceedings.);
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
([A] defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of
preventing that witness from testifying also waives his right to confrontation ....
[W]hen confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very person
who would assert the right, logic dictates that the right has been waived. The law
simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from murdering the chief
witness against him.).
Id.
128. 349 F.3d at 1304.
129. 351 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 501. Because of the date this case was filed, it was not decided under the
heightened burden of proof requirements of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
(CAFRA), 106 Pub. L. No. 185, 114 Stat. 202. Id. at 501 n.2. CAFRA raised the
government's burden of proof from probable cause to a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 515 n.30. See 21 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) ("In a suit or action brought under any civil
forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property.., the burden of proof is on the
Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject
to forfeiture.").
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York, she twice changed her return date. The claimant was stopped at
the airport in Miami, Florida, by DEA agents. The claimant provided
the agents with her ticket and identification, which were in her own
name, and she told the agents she was carrying about $200,000 in her
backpack. The agents found the cash wrapped in two packages-one in
black plastic and the other in Christmas wrapping. Each package of
cash contained bundles of varying sizes and denominations that did not
bear the binding of a bank or other financial institution. After agreeing
to accompany the DEA agents to their airport office, the claimant first
stated that she was in New York for a court case, and she later stated
that she was in New York to pick up the money. The agents brought in
their drug-detection dog, "Rambo," who alerted to the backpack
containing the cash.' 3
After noting that in determining probable cause, the courts "must
consider the 'totality of the circumstances"' with a "common sense view
to the realities of normal life,"'32 the Eleventh Circuit examined each
circumstance relied upon to find probable cause. 3 The court recognized that carrying large amounts of cash, while being somewhat
suspicious, is not unlawful.' 34 Moreover, in a forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),' 3 ' "the government must evidence a connection-beyond proof that a drug crime may be one of several similarly
likely possibilities-between the seized money and an illegal narcotics
transaction.'3 6 In $242,484.00 the court concluded that "it is about as
likely that the money-if not legitimate-was the result of extortion, gun
running, bank robbery, illegal gambling, simple tax evasion, exporting
stolen goods, or any number of other possibilities.""' 7
The court dismissed as insignificant the Government's argument that
the cash was wrapped to conceal its presence.1 3 ' The claimant never
concealed from law enforcement officers that she was carrying the
cash. 139 The court also dismissed the fact that the claimant was
traveling between two "source cities." 4 ° The court noted that the
significance of travel between "source cities" has decreased as the

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

351 F.3d at 502-03.
Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
Id. at 506-10.
Id. at 507.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2000).
351 F.3d at 507.
Id. at 507-08.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 509.
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number of "source cities" has increased.' 4 ' The court stated, "The more
'travel between source cities' comes to mean just 'travel,' the less
persuasive such travel becomes in the probable-cause analysis."' 4' In
addition, because the claimant in this case was from Miami and
returning home, the court was "hesita[ntl to say that every resident of
South Florida has one strike against them for forfeiture purposes should
they choose to travel and then to return home.""
The court was
similarly dismissive of the drug dog's detection of the currency, stating
that "when perhaps as much as [eighty percent] of currency in circulation has drug residue on it, we are concerned that Rambo would have
the same reaction to [eighty percent] of the circulated currency placed
in front of him."'
The court in $242,484.00 concluded that the evidence fell well short of
showing probable cause to believe that "a 'substantial connection' exists
between the funds at issue here and a narcotics transaction." 45 The
court also emphasized the limited nature of its holding. 4 ' The court
stated that "[o]ther cases are not before us; so, every word we have
written must be read in the context of this forfeiture case." 47 The
court stressed that while the standard for probable cause remains the
same for determining the legality of arrests, searches, and seizures, the
quantum of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause standard
varies "depending on what kind of government act the probable cause is
to justify."'"
2. Information Obtained by Private Persons. In United States
v. Steiger,149 defendant appealed the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress. An anonymous source sent an e-mail to the
Montgomery, Alabama, Police Department on July 16, 2000, advising the
Department that he had found a child molester on the Internet who was
abusing children. The source attached to the e-mail an electronic image
file depicting a white male abusing a white female approximately four

141. Id. at 509 n.17.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 511. The court also noted the irony in the fact that the DEA exchanged the
seized currency for a cashier's check at a bank, where the tainted currency "was, possibly,
placed back into circulation for innocent people to possess." Id. at 510 n.21.
145. Id. at 513.
146. Id. at 516 n.33.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court cites a number of cases that discuss the quantum of evidence
necessary to establish probable cause in varying circumstances. Id.
149. 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003).
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to six years old. A police officer replied to the e-mail on July 17, 2000,
asking the source to call him. The source responded that he would not
call, but he could send everything via e-mail. The officer invited the
anonymous source to send any information he had. In response the
source e-mailed eight images showing the adult white male sexually
abusing a very young girl. The source identified the molester by name,
provided the molester's Internet service account information with AT&T
Worldnet, provided a possible home address for the molester, and
provided a telephone number the molester used to connect to the
Internet. The source also advised the police officer that he had the
molester's Internet Protocol (IP) number.5 ° In response to a request
from the police officer, the source provided three IP addresses used by
the molester on July 14 and 15. The source also provided unsolicited
information, providing the molester's checking account records and
specific folders where
the pornographic images were stored on the
5
molester's computer.1 '
The police officer in Steiger provided the information to an FBI agent,
who independently verified much of the information. The FBI agent
then prepared an affidavit stating that an anonymous source had located
a child molester on the Internet, described the information that the
source had obtained prior to making any contact with the police, and
described the steps the agent took to corroborate that information. The
agent did not specifically state in the affidavit that the source had
2
obtained the information by hacking into the molester's computer.1
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the molester's claims that the search
warrant was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 5 3 The
court stressed that the source acted as a private individual, and "[a]
search by a private person does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
unless he acts as an instrument or agent of the government." 15

4

An

individual is not considered an "agent of the government" unless "the
government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and ... the

150. Id. at 1041-42. "An IP number, also known as an Internet Protocol ("IP") address,
'is the unique address assigned to a particular computer connected to the Internet.'" Id.
(quoting Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1145 (2002)).
151. Id. at 1042.
152. Id. at 1043. The court in Steiger explains in detail how the source was able to
hack into the molester's computer. Id. at 1043-44. In e-mail correspondence between the
source and the police, the source described himself in a manner that can best be described
as a cyber-vigilante, and he claimed to have caught at least 2000 child pornographers in
his trap. Id.
153. Id. at 1048.
154. Id.
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private actor's purpose was to assist law enforcement efforts rather than
to further his own ends."15 In concluding that the source acted as a
private person, the court stressed that the probable cause determination
was based on information conveyed in the first two e-mails, which the
source obtained prior to making contact with the police department and
the FBI agent's corroboration of some of that information." 6
The court also rejected the molester's arguments for suppression based
on the FBI agent's failure to state in the warrant affidavit that the
source had obtained the information by hacking into the molester's
computer.157 The court reasoned, "To justify suppression of evidence
seized under a warrant, the alleged deliberate or reckless failure to
include material information in the affidavit must conceal information
that would defeat probable cause."' 58 The court reasoned that because
the source in this case acted as a private person who was not subject to
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, "a statement that the
anonymous source had hacked into [the molester's] computer to obtain
that information would not have affected the magistrate's finding of
probable cause."'59
E.

Strip Searches

The issue before the court in Evans v. City of Zebulon"6 ° was whether the district court properly denied defendant police officer qualified
Plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
immunity.161
§ 1983,162 contending that the defendant police officer subjected them
to an unconstitutional strip search. Plaintiffs were subjected to a patdown search at the time of their arrest and upon their arrival at the jail.
In addition the arresting officer conducted a thorough search of the car
and area surrounding it, finding only a beer can and a poptop. 1 The

155. Id. (citing United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (in which
searches initiated by Federal Express employees in the normal course of business for the
purpose of determining where to deliver a parcel discovered child pornography in the
parcel)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1045-46.
158. Id. at 1046.
159. Id. The court also rejected the molester's arguments that the evidence should be
suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act. Id. Even if the
information was obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act, the court concluded that the Act
only provides for suppression of wire or oral communications, not stored electronic
communications of the type involved in the case before it. Id. at 1050.
160. 351 F.3d 485 (11th Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 487.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
163. 351 F.3d at 491.
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arresting officer did not observe plaintiffs attempt to hide anything
beneath their clothing prior to arrest, and plaintiffs, "who presumably
did not anticipate being arrested that night, had no apparent motive at
the time of the traffic stop to conceal contraband underneath their
clothing for smuggling into the jail."'6
The court recognized that "[a]rrestees who are to be detained in the
general jail population can constitutionally be subjected to a strip search
only if the search is supported by reasonable suspicion that such a
search will reveal weapons or contraband." 165 In this case, there was
nothing to provide support for such a search.116 The fact that plaintiffs
had been subjected to two pat-down searches prior to the strip search,
which did not reveal incriminating evidence, only tended to dispel,
rather than heighten, any reasonable suspicion. 167 Although the court
found the strip searches unconstitutional, defendant officer was entitled
to qualified immunity in the civil context because the law was not
clearly established at the time of the searches that reasonable suspicion
was required to conduct the strip searches.'r
The court also concluded that the manner in which the searches were
conducted, as described by plaintiffs, violated the Fourth Amendment. 69 The court stated that in considering the reasonableness of the
manner in which strip searches are conducted, courts should consider (1)
the degree of privacy afforded the individual being searched; (2) whether
the person conducting the search was of the same sex as the person
being searched; (3) whether the search was conducted under hygienic
conditions; (4) whether the search involved physical contact; and (5)
whether the search was conducted in a professional manner. 70 In this
case plaintiffs were not searched in a private location, they were taunted
with threats and abusive language, and defendant officer did not clean
or use other sanitary safeguards on the slender metal object used for the
body cavity search of one plaintiff before using it on the next plaintiff.'7' Again, however, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity
in the civil context because the law was not clearly established at the
time of the searches that
the manner in which he conducted the searches
172
was unconstitutional.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

490.
491.
491-92.
492.
493.
492.
493.
494.

1168

F

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Warrants: Sufficiency and Good Faith

Defendant in United States v. Robinson 7 ' contended on appeal that
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and applying
the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The warrant
affidavit in Robinson relied upon information from two different
confidential informants that defendant was cooking and storing crack
cocaine. At the time the warrant was issued, the information from one
informant was almost three months old, and the information from the
other informant was over ten months old. The affidavit stated that the
officer independently verified the information in the warrant, but it did
not state how the officer verified the information.'7 4 The officer did
conduct two "trash pulls;" however, these were conducted from a multifamily trash receptacle.'7 5 The officer did not testify at the suppression hearing.'7 6
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the "good-faith" exception set
forth in United States v. Leon'77 "'stands for the principle that courts
generally should not render inadmissable evidence obtained by police
officers acting in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant that is
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.'"'7 8 The
Leon good-faith exception does not apply when: (1) an officer deliberately, or in reckless disregard of the truth, places false or misleading
information in a warrant; (2) the issuing judge wholly abandons his or
her role; (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render unreasonable official belief in the existence of probable cause; and
(4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the officers reasonably cannot
presume the warrant to be valid. 7 9
The court quickly rejected defendant's argument that the search
warrant affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
unreasonable the official belief in its existence." ° The court also

173. 336 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
174. Id. at 1294-95.
175. Id. at 1295. "A 'trash pull' is an undercover investigative technique in which the
police search a person's trash which has been placed at or near the street, which is outside
the curtilage of the home." United States v. Chapman, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (M.D.
Ga. 2002). There is no Fourth Amendment protection for garbage or trash when it is set
out for collection. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
176. 336 F.3d at 1294.
177. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
178. 336 F.3d at 1295-96 (quoting United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
179. Id. at 1296.
180. Id.

2004]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1169

rejected defendant's argument that, regardless of the applicability of any
of the four exceptions to Leon, the Government failed to carry the burden
of demonstrating the applicability of the good-faith exception when it did
not "present evidence beyond the four corners of the affidavit to
demonstrate that [the officer] reasonably relied on the search warrant."'
The Eleventh Circuit explained that while a court "may
consider information known to [the officer] that was not presented in the
initial search warrant application or affidavit"'8 2 in determining
whether execution of the search warrant was reasonable, there is no
requirement that the Government must present evidence beyond the four
corners of the affidavit to meet its burden of demonstrating applicability
of the Leon good-faith exception. 183 The court pointed out that if
evidence existed suggesting that the officer's reliance on the warrant was
objectively unreasonable, defendant was free to present that evidence."i 4

III.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A.

Waiver of MirandaRights
In Hart v. Attorney General of Florida,8" the Eleventh Circuit, after
examining the totality of the circumstances, concluded that defendant's
waiver of his Miranda rights was "the product of deception and was not
'made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'"'8 6 In
Hart a detective presented a Miranda wavier form to defendant,
explained each right on the form, and had defendant initial each right
indicating he understood the right. Defendant also signed that he was
willing to answer questions without an attorney being present.'8 7
The Eleventh Circuit stated that "[a]lthough a signed Mirandawaiver
form is 'usually strong proof' that a suspect voluntarily waived his
rights, it is not conclusive on this issue." 8 In this case the trial court
erred by not examining the totality of the circumstances when determining whether defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1297.
Id. (quoting Martin, 297 F.3d at 1318). See Cox, supra note 70, at 1416-19.
336 F.3d at 1297.
Id.
323 F.3d 884 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 813 (2003).
Id. at 893 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
Id. at 887-88.
Id. at 893.
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knowing, and intelligent.189 Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit not
only looked at the circumstances leading up to execution of the waiver
form, but it also looked at the events that transpired after execution of
the waiver form.19 ° The court "examine[d] the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' to determine whether [defendant's] decision to waive his rights was made voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently." 9'
Subsequent to defendant's execution of the waiver form, defendant
asked another detective several questions about whether he needed a
lawyer and about the pros and cons of hiring a lawyer.'92 The court
stated, "Although asking for the pros and cons of hiring a lawyer is not
an unequivocal request for counsel, it does indicate that [defendant] did
not fully understand his right to counsel and was asking for clarification
of that right." 93 In response to defendant's subsequent questions
about an attorney, the detective advised him that "the disadvantage of
having a lawyer present was that the lawyer would tell [defendant] not
to answer incriminating questions." 94 In contrast to the advice the
detective gave to defendant, "The reason for requiring a lawyer during
custodial interrogation is to protect a suspect's privilege against selfincrimination." 195 The detective also told the defendant that "'honesty
wouldn't hurt him'""' yet that advice contradicted and was incompatible with the Miranda warning that "'anything you say can be used
against you in court."" 97 The court concluded that
[gliven the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
...[defendant's] decision to waive his rights and confess was the
product of [the detective's] deception and, as a result of her contradictory statements, he did not truly understand the nature of his right

189. Id.
190. Id. at 893-94.
191. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 894.
193. Id. The lower court, relying on Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-61 (1994)
(After a suspect waives the right to counsel, officers need not terminate an interrogation
unless the suspect unambiguously requests counsel. Officers need nqt cease questioning
upon "an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney"), concluded that defendant's
questions did not amount to an unequivocal request for an attorney, and it denied the
motion to suppress. 323 F.3d at 890. The Eleventh Circuit held that the lower court erred
by only applying Davis, without also following the direction of the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Moran to consider the totality of the circumstances of the
interrogation. Id. at 892-93 (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 421).
194. 323 F.3d at 892-93.
195. Id.
196. Id.

197. Id.
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against self-incrimination or the consequences that would result from
waiving it.198

Therefore,

defendant's

statements were obtained

in violation of

99
Miranda.'

IV.

A.

FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11

Some of the cases surveyed in this Article arose after a defendant
entered a guilty plea, conditioned on his right to appeal the lower court's
denial of a motion to suppress. In addition to the constitutional
protections provided to criminal defendants, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure °0 provides certain core protections to a defendant entering a plea of guilty. In United States v. Monroe,2"' defendant contended that the district court erred under Rule 11 when it did
not explicitly inform him of his right against compelled self-incrimination when he entered his guilty plea.20 2 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed
defendant's claim of error under the plain-error analysis °3 because
defendant did not object to the plea colloquy during the plea hearing or
at sentencing, and he did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.2 4 The court noted that plain-error review and harmless-error
review have two important differences.20' First, while the Government
bears the burden of proving that the claimed error does not prejudice a

198. Id. at 895.
199. Id.
200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
201. 353 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003).
202. Id. at 1349.
203. Id.
Under plain-error review, the defendant has the burden to show that "there is (1)
'error' (2) that is 'plain' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'" . . . "Ifall three
conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice
a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
204. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court clearly decided in United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 74 (2002), that plain-error review can apply to claimed Rule 11
violations, even though Rule 11 contains only a harmless-error review provision in
subsection (h). 353 F.3d at 1353. In contrast to the situation in Monroe, the Eleventh
Circuit reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on a Rule 11
violation under the harmless error standard. Id. at 1349-50 n.2.
205. 353 F.3d at 1352. In the appellate context, whether a procedural error will result
in any relief to defendant often is determined by the standard of review utilized by the
court of appeals when reviewing the claimed error. Id.
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defendant's substantial rights under harmless-error review, the
defendant bears the burden of proving the effect on substantial rights
under plain-error analysis." 6 Second, in plain-error review, a court
can exercise its discretion to notice error "only if the error also 'seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"207
The court determined that defendant failed to carry his burden of
showing that his rights were substantially affected by the district court's
failure to specifically advise him of his right against compelled selfincrimination. 20 8
Defendant did not show, or even argue, that he
would not have pleaded guilty had the court fully advised him of his
right against compelled self-incrimination. 0 9 In addition, the plea
colloquy did satisfy the core concerns of Rule 11.210 The district court's
plea colloquy made clear to defendant that he had numerous rights, that
he did not have to plead guilty, that he could continue in his plea of not
guilty and proceed to trial, and that he was waiving these rights by
pleading guilty.211 Perhaps recognizing the seeming incongruity in the
reasoning that defendant was not prejudiced because he waived a right
that he had not been informed he possessed, the court held in the
alternative that the court should not exercise its discretion to notice
plain error because the error did not "'seriously affect[] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' ' 212 The court
explained that defendant "faced overwhelming evidence,"213 and "'it
would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would [seriously

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1356.
209. Id.
210. Id. The "core objectives" of Rule 11 are "(1) ensuring that the guilty plea is free
of coercion; (2) ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against
him; and (3) ensuring that the defendant is aware of the direct consequences of the guilty
plea." Id. at 1354.
211. Id. at 1356. The court distinguished four prior plain-error cases in which the court
concluded that a Rule 11 error did substantially affect a defendant's rights. See United
States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez-Raire,
208 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. James, 210 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Quinones, 97 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 1996). In each of those prior cases, the
plea colloquy not only failed to inform the defendant of certain rights, but the plea colloquy
also failed to inform the defendant that he waived those rights by pleading guilty. 353
F.3d at 1355.
212. 353 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Vonn, 535 U.S. at 63).
213. Id. at 1357.
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affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed214
ings].' ,

214.

Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997)).

*

*

*

